

מסכת יומא

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Introduction to Masechet Yuma

Note: I will often transliterate Hebrew words, so don't mind them.

Also, I find the best way to study from these notes is to read a passage of Gemara, read the notes, then reread the passage.

<u>Punishments for:</u>	<u>Shabbat</u>	<u>Yom Kippur</u>	<u>Yom Tov</u>
<u>Sins on purpose</u>	Death/Karet (כרת)	Karet	Malkot (Whips)
<u>Sins by accident</u>	חטאת	חטאת	Punishment in Heaven

Shabbat Shabaton- Like Shabbat, you are not allowed to cook, carry, etc.

Restrictions on Eating- Normally when the Torah imposes upon us a restriction on eating, a person is only guilty if he ate כזית with food or רביעית with a drink.

However, on Yom Kippur, these limits change. For food the limit is ככותבת הגסה, a large date, and for drink it is מלוא לוגמיו, when a person's cheeks are filled.

All the other times when the Torah mentions restrictions on eating, it has the some form of the word אכילה. However, when the Torah speaks about Yom Kippur, it does not say this; rather, it says a form of the word ועיניתם.

Mishnah

On Yom Kippur, it is forbidden to eat, drink, bathe, apply ointments, wear leather shoes, or to engage in relations. Rabbi Eliezer says that it is permitted for a king or bride to wash their face, and for a woman who has given birth to wear shoes. Chachamim forbid these three things.

A person who eats kotevet hagasah (ככותבת הגסה) with its pit or drinks meloh lugmav (מלוא לוגמיו), is guilty for karet. If a person ate under the specified amount, perhaps a crumb or something, then later on ate more, the amount adds up and if it reaches the limit of kotevet hagasah, the person is guilty. Similarly, a person who drinks under the limit for beverages but continues to drink, it will collectively add up. However, food or drink will add up *only* if they are eaten within the time it takes to eat a loaf of bread (כדי אכילת פרס), which is 2-9 minutes long. However, if someone eats a little food and drinks a little, they will *not* add up together collectively, because they are two entirely different things. It's like mixing oil and water. One is measured one way, the other thing measured another way.

Rashi says that the things that are forbidden to do on Yom Kippur that are not included in the Melachot of Shabbat are called Inuyim (עינויים). He continues, saying that the probation of eating and drinking are considered one category, making there 5 Inuyim.

Rashi asks why 5? Because in the Torah, the word ענני is mentioned five times in relation to Yom Kippur.

Gemara

[skipping to : ע"ד ע"ז for a moment]

The mishnah which states that the king and bride may wash their face and the woman who has just given birth may wear shoes, are the words of R' Chanina ben Tradyon, who says it in the name of R' Eliezer.

Why is the king allowed to wash his face? Because of the passuk

“מלך ביופיו תחזינה עיניך” – A king shall appear before your eyes in his handsomeness. From this we see that a king must remain decent-looking, because he is the representative of Am Yisrael.

Why is a bride allowed to wash her face? In order for her not to be embarrassed in the eyes of her husband from not looking good.

Rav asked R' Chiya, “For how long is a bride called a bride?” R' Chiya responded saying, “In a Breita it is written ‘אין מונעין תכשיטין מן הכלה כל שלשים יום’, we do not prevent the bride from wearing jewelery for thirty days in relation to the case if a parent dies before or during her wedding, even though she is אבל, she may wear jewelery in order to look good for her husband.”

Why may a woman who has given birth [within 30 days of the birth] wear leather shoes? Because without shoes, the woman's feet would be cold. Shmuel says that if you are afraid of being bitten by a scorpion if you have bare feet, then you may wear shoes.

[returning to : ע"ד ע"ז]

Tosafot Yeshanim says that it appears as if the restriction on eating and drinking comes from the Torah, and the remaining Inuyim are from Rabanan. There are several proofs for this. First: The punishment for eating or drinking is karet, while for the others it is not. Second: R' Eliezer states the three exceptions that would not be able to be said if the other Inuyim (washing, wearing shoes, etc.) were from the Torah, therefore they are from Rabanan. Third: Another mishnah states that a person who has injuries about the head may anoint his head with a healing cream. Fourth: Another mishnah also states that a person who fell into mud or tar, and his hands became dirty, is allowed to wash his hands.

The Tosafot bring another opinion, that *all* Inuyim are from the Torah. It does this by disproving the previous proofs. It disproves the karet proof by saying that when a person does not bathe or anoint himself with cream, he won't experience *so* much inconvenience. But if he does not eat or drink, then he will certainly experience the inconvenience. Therefore, since eating and drinking are vital to the person, their probation is more strict. Also, Tosafot disprove the remaining proofs by saying that the Torah stated that all the Inuyim such as bathing and anointing apply only to the entire person's body; if it is applied to only a single part of the body, it is allowed.

The Ran says that all the Inuyim are from the Torah, but the exceptions were made by Anshei Knesset Hagedolah when Moshe told them that their word would be the will of Hashem.

The Gemara asks why the Mishnah starts with the word אסור. Why does it not simply state the punishment if one does? Isn't it more effective? So why doesn't it say that if a person eats they receive karet?

R' Eila says that normally you wouldn't use the word אסור, but in this case the Mishnah speaks of חצי שער.

Rashi says that חצי שער is an amount that is below kotevet hagasah or meloh lugmav. He continues, saying that it is not specifically half of it, but any amount less than it.

The Gemara states that this is an obvious answer for those who say chatzi shiur is prohibited from the Torah. But what will we say about the person who says that chatzi shiur is permitted from the Torah?

R' Yochanan says that chatzi shiur is prohibited from the Torah but Reish Lakish says it is permitted from the Torah. The answer that the Gemara provided is obvious according to R' Yochanan, but what about Reish Lakish? Reish Lakish explains himself and says that chatzi shiur is prohibited from Rabanan instead.

[401 classes only]

If a person takes upon himself an oath [שבועת בטוי] not to eat during the day, and he ends up eating non-kosher food, Tana Kamma says he is required to bring a קרבן, while R' Shimon says that he is not required to.

So why would he be required to? Isn't the prohibition on eating non-kosher food already stated in the Torah (מושב ועומד מזה סיני)?

Rav, Shmuel, and R' Yochanan all say that if he swore not to eat anything, the shvuah on not eating even Kosher things is valid, and it hooks on the rest of the shvuah, which is invalid. R' Shimon says that even this 'hooking on' approach doesn't work.

Reish Lakish says that the person explicitly swore not to eat chatzi shiur, which is *permitted* from the Torah, and therefore the shvuah is valid, and if he breaks the oath, he is required to bring a korban. Reish Lakish says that R' Shimon says he is בטור, because he holds like R' Yochanan who says that chatzi shiur is from the Torah.

But didn't Reish Lakish say that chatzi shiur is prohibited from Rabanan?

Perhaps something that is permitted from the Torah is possible to make a shvuat bituy on, even though it is prohibited from Rabanan.

We arrive at a contradiction in Reish Lakish's words. We know that a decree imposed by Rabanan has the strength of an אסור from the Torah, from the concept of לא תסור. So then we see that the Rabbinic decree that chatzi shiur is prohibited as if it is from the Torah. But if it is from the Torah, wouldn't it be considered מושב ועומד מזה סיני, on which any oath made upon it would be invalid, and would not require a korban? The answer is that something from Rabanan, even though it becomes equated with something from the Torah, is not as powerful as something directly from the Torah,

because the punishments are more lenient. A Rabbinic decree is not considered to be מושבע ועומד מזהר סיני.

Now we come to yet another question on Reish Lakish's words. Rashi brings a mishnah from שבועות. The רישא of the mishnah states that a person who gives עדות and lies is required to bring a korban, only if they are considered kosher witnesses; they must be unrelated men. The סיפא says that a person who lies in testimony is not required to bring a korban unless he is a kosher witness.

What is the חידוש in the Seifa? When the Reisha says that only kosher witnesses are allowed, it only takes into consideration the criteria that the Torah supplies us, which is the person must not be a robber and must not be related to the defendant. *But*, Rabanan say that a professional gambler is not allowed to testify either (R' Papa says that it is a king while R' Acha bar Yaakov says that it is a professional gambler). That's where the Seifa comes in. The Reisha only spoke about the Torah's criteria, but the Seifa speaks about Rabanan's as well.

In this case we see something that is permitted from the Torah and yet prohibited from Rabanan (the professional gambler), like we saw in chatzi shiur. But yet, we said that in chatzi shiur, he is required to bring a korban, and here he is not. We have arrived at yet another contradiction.

The resolution of the contradiction is as follows. The two things *cannot* be equated, because they are different. In chatzi shiur, he is liable for a korban because Rabanan do not have the power like the Torah does, and therefore the shvuah is invalid. But here we see that the professional gambler is not liable because he swore falsely *outside of the courtroom*. He is not liable for a korban, because if he were to come to a court, they would not allow him to testify. He is not required to bring a korban because he is not a kosher witness, and the Reisha/Seifa clearly state that a false witness must be a kosher witness in order to bring a korban. So now we see that chatzi shiur and shvuat eidut are two entirely different things.

[all classes]

The Gemara returns to the question of putting אסור and not ענוש כרת. The Gemara thought that the word אסור did not include karet. The Gemara brings a Breita that says that even though *all* of the inuyim are אסור, only a few are ענוש כרת (eating, drinking, melachah). This Breita says that when the Mishnah says אסור, it is talking about chatzi shiur, which is the most lenient, and is just prohibited. However, karet is included in the word as well, because the Mishnah can also be talking about a full shiur [of eating or drinking], which is punished by karet.

[end of this Gemara. The next Gemara begins with the word גופא]

The Gemara returns to the machloket between Reish Lakish and R' Yochanan (about chatzi shiur). R' Yochanan says that chatzi shiur is אסור from the Torah because you are able to add it up collectively (see Mishnah section on page 1). The way we see that it is from the Torah, is because if collectively they are אסור, then the first chatzi shiur had to be אסור as well.

Reish Lakish says that chatzi shiur is permitted from the Torah because the Torah only speaks about אכילה, which is a full shiur.

Here are two pesukim to keep in mind before I continue:

“כל חלב שור כשב ועז לא תאכלו”
“כי כל אוכל מן הבהמה ונכרתה הנפש...”

R' Yochanan asks a question on Reish Lakish. He says that we know אכילה has a warning and a punishment (from the pesukim above). Then comes in a Breita and says that since chelev koi (חלב כוי) and chatzi shiur have no punishment (because they are in doubt), then perhaps they do not have a warning. But no, we see from the pasuk “כל חלב” that there *is* a warning, and therefore there *is* a punishment. We see that chatzi shiur is prohibited from the Torah from this, and it is a proof for R' Yochanan. (Note: This is all dependant on the way it is learned; R' Yochanan learns it as a direct thing from the Torah.)

Reish Lakish says that it is rather an asmachta (אסמכתא) because the hint from the pasuk is that koi is prohibited. In Shamayim, there aren't any doubts and they don't need to write a separate pasuk as R' Yochanan suggests, but rather it is a hint, a remez in the Torah. And if it is a hint, then also chatzi shiur must be a hint. Therefore it must be from Rabanan. The pasuk does *not* teach us directly, but it teaches in a remez.

Rashi says that because the word כל is in the pasuk (the second one, above), perhaps there is a punishment for *every* amount? But we know that karet only comes on a full shiur! Rather, the כל is talking about the *person*, not the chelev itself.

R' Yochanan defends himself by saying that koi is an entirely separate category of beings (in addition to chaya and behemah). So koi is *not* safek, but just a separate being.

R' Idi bar Avin comes in and says that the “כל” in the pasuk “כל דם לא תאכלו” speaks about the blood of a koi. R' Yochanan asks why does the Torah need to bring this new pasuk just for a doubt? Therefore, it *must* be that it is not a doubt, and just simply is a separate being.

Tosafot ask why R' Yochanan did not directly refer to the Breita about כל חלב? Of course he knows about the Breita, because he used it to question Reish Lakish. Tosafot answer that it is possible to say that the word כל is only for koi, and chatzi shiur is an asmachta. But then R' Yochanan's original logic, about the collectivity of chatzi shiur, comes to back up his point.

Now the Gemara moves onto a new topic. It focuses on the pasuk “תענו את נפשותכם”
It is possible to think that one must actively cause pain to himself with heat or cold. For
that reason, it is written in that pasuk “וכל מלאכה לא תעשו,” specifically
emphasizing the לא תעשו part, which says that you should not go out of your way and
cause pain to yourself, but rather if a chance for pleasure comes by, you should not take
it.

A person who is sitting in the sun and becomes hot is prohibited to get up and go sit in
the shade. The same thing applies to a person who is cold; he may not go to a heated
place.

The Gemara says that because melacha is always prohibited, infliction of pain is always.
Note that I say always with nothing following it; this is because we do not know if it
always actively inflicting pain or always prohibited. Furthermore, we do not include heat
and cold in infliction of pain because if we did it would not be ‘always’. If a person sat in
the heat, he is not permitted to comfort himself, but on the other hand, a person who is
not hot is not required to sit in the sun.

[now moving to עו 77]

The Gemara asks why are there specifically five Inuyim. R’ Chisda says that it is because
of the five times the word “עינוי” is written in the Torah. But there are only five times it
is mentioned, and there are six Inuyim in the Mishnah! The answer is
שתיה בכלל אכילה – drinking is included in eating.

What is the source of this answer from the Torah?

Reish Lakish says it is from the pasuk “ואכלת... דגנך תירושך ויצהרדך” (in relation to
Maaser Sheni). He says that תירוש is wine, so why would the Torah say you eat wine,
unless drinking is included in eating?

The Gemara disproves this by saying that it is possible that the food is אניגרין or
אכסיגרין.

Rabah bar Shmuel says that אניגרין is spinach cooked with water and wine. He says that
אכסיגרין is every other vegetable that is cooked with oil and wine.

R’ Acha bar Yaakov says that there is a pasuk that says

“ונתתה הכסף... ביין ובשכר... ואכלת”. So we see from this that drinking *must* be
included in eating. But perhaps it is also possible here that it is אניגרין? No, it is not
possible, because if food is mixed with beer (שכר), it loses its status of being a potent
alcoholic beverage.

The Gemara disproves also this. It is possible that this pasuk is not talking about real
drinks, but rather a food that has the effect of wine or beer. When a תאנה קעילית was
eaten with milk and honey, it had the same intoxicating effect as wine or beer.

So then what is the source for drinking is included in eating?

By a Nazir, there is a pasuk that says “ממין ושכר יזיר וכל משרת ענבים לא ישתה”
We learn by the way of שורה גזרה that wine and beer *are* beverages (and not an
intoxicating food or אניגרין). With this, we are able to revert to the first proof by Reish
Lakish.

[new Gemara, :טז טז]

The Gemara now discusses the Inuy of washing. It is forbidden to wash even part of one's body. However, there are exceptions. If one's hands were dirty with mud or tar, he is permitted to wash them. Why? Because the איסור of washing is just on washing for pleasure (that is the way Chachamim established). It is forbidden to anoint even a part of one's body, but if he had bruises about his head, he may anoint it with a healing cream. Rashbag says that a woman may wash her hand in water before she gives a child bread to eat. Rashi and Tosafot attempt to explain the reasoning behind this. Rashi says that she may do so because there is a ruach raah on the bread that is bestowed upon it by the shaid (טז) Shibta. Rashi says further that this applies only in the morning. The Gemara continues, saying that Shamai HaZakken washed his hand before feeding a child, and was told that he must wash both hands. Why? Abayei says because of Shibta. Tosafot say that Rabeinu Tam says that everyone may wash their hands, not because of Shibta, but for the sake of cleaning it, because we already learned that one may wash his hands if they are dirty with mud. Tosafot say that before one feeds a child of about 4 or 5, he must wash his hands. They also say that one may still wash his hands, since there are no shaidim today (because we rejected the shaidim proof).

A person who goes to greet his father, rabbi, or someone who is greater than him in knowledge, may cross a river and wade in water up to his neck to greet them. The Gemara asks if a rabbi is permitted to do the same to greet his student. R' Yitzchak bar Chana says that he saw Zeiri cross the river to visit his student R' Chiya bar Ashi. However, R' Ashi says that R' Chiya visited his rabbi Zeiri. The Gemara remains in doubt of the question.

The Bahag says that the fact that the Gemara writes specifically, "a person may cross until his neck" shows that swimming would be prohibited (since swimming would require a person's full body to be allowed to be in the water, the Gemara specifically says no, it's not a person's full body, but just up to his neck. Therefore swimming is prohibited.) The Tur argues this and holds that swimming is *permitted*. The Tur says that if an Inuy of washing, which is a lot more strict, is permitted, then kal vachomer a simple איסור of swimming, would be permitted. The Beit Yosef explains the Bahag and says that the איסור of swimming pertains to Shabbat, while the איסור of washing pertains to Yom Kippur. If the two איסורים are from two different things, they cannot be compared. Therefore swimming remains אסור. But according to the Tur, the reason that "until his neck" is written is because if it wasn't, we would think the whole body may be in the water, which it is not, and it is a bigger איסור.

The Meiri says that if one entered the water, one will want to wring out his clothes, which is prohibited. But because he entered in such an odd fashion with his clothes on, he will remember that he may not wring out his clothes.

Back in the Gemara, Rava permitted the people of ימינא עבר to cross the river to guard their fruits, to which Abayei brings a Breita in support of him. The Meiri asks why it is

permitted to cross the river because of a loss of money? Because he does not derive pleasure from entering the water with his clothes on.

R' Yosef permitted the people of **בִּי תַרְבוּ** to cross the river in order to come to a shiur, but forbade them to go back home. Abayei argues with him and says that because of the fact that R' Yosef didn't allow them to return home, they won't want to come next year on Yom Kippur in order to hear the shiur. So then Abayei says that R' Yosef must allow them to return if he wants them to come at all in the beginning.

The Gemara brings another possible version of this story. It says that R' Yosef allowed the people both to come to the shiur *and* to return home. Abayei asks him why did he allow them to return home? To which R' Yosef responds by saying that if he had not, they would not have come in the first place.

R' Yehuda and R' Shmuel his son were standing on a river bank by a place where the water is slow and possible to cross. On the other side of the river was the town Chatzdad, and right across from them was R' Papa. R' Papa raised his voice and asked R' Yehuda and R' Shmuel from across the river if he is allowed to cross the river in order to ask them about a **סוגיא** in Gemara. R' Yehuda answered him in response, saying that Rav and Shmuel agree that he may cross the river, but only on the condition that he does not lift up the bottom of his robe to prevent it from getting wet when he crosses.

Rashi expounds on this last statement and says that if he were to lift the robe, it would be considered as the **איסור** of carrying.

[*new Gemara, ע"ט 77*]

The new Gemara now speaks about the size of kotevet hagasah. R' Papa asks if kotevet hagasah is with or without a pit. Isn't it specifically written in the Mishnah that it is with a pit?

Tosafot attempt to explain this question. Tosafot say that R' Papa is asking if kotevet hagasah means a date and its own pit, or a date, its own pit, plus another pit.

Tosafot Yeshanim ask why all of a sudden the Gemara gets stopped with problems here, and not with **כזית** (olives have pits too, there should be a question there as well). By **כזית**, it's obvious that it means with a pit, but here, since the Mishnah added the sentence about "one who eats kotevet hagasah *with its pit*..." we come to a question.

R' Ashi asks if, with **כשעורה** **עצם**, does the **שעורה** include it's outer shell (which would make it bigger)? Is it dry or moist (which also would make it bigger)?

(**עצם כשעורה** is the rule that anyone who touches a bone that is even the size of a grain of barley makes you tameh.)

R' Papa and R' Ashi's questions look similar, why didn't they ask the same things?

Because to R' Ashi, there was no doubt to R' Papa's question because the Mishnah wrote "*gasah*" which means it would be a large date with its own pit plus another.

To R' Papa, there was no doubt on R' Ashi's question because if it was moist, then it would be called a **שבולת**, therefore it is dry. And if it meant a grain without it's shell, it would be called an **אושלא**.

The Gemara remains in doubt of the questions.

R' Yehuda says that kotevet hagasah is more than a beitzah (ביצרה). Rabanan accepted this answer since this is an amount that would satisfy a person enough to break the fast (מיתבא דעתיה).

Rashi says that generally the shiur in the Torah for eating is kazayit (כזית). Why is it that here in Yom Kippur there is a different shiur? Because all the times kazayit is used, the Torah has the word "אכילה", but by Yom Kippur, there was the word "עינוי".

Now we will ask a question on R' Yehuda. But before we do, we bring in two stories to show us the question.

R' Yochanan ben Zakkai was brought food to taste (on Sukkot) and Rabban Gamliel was brought two dates and a bucket of water. Rabban Gamliel said to eat them in the Sukkah, even though they were not required to. We learn from this that two dates are below the amount required to have to eat in the Sukkah.

R' Tzaddok ate less than a beitzah. He held the food in a napkin or cloth, ate outside of the Sukkah, and didn't say Birkat Hamazon after eating.

Rashi says that he held it in a napkin because of אַנְיָוֹת הַדָּעוּת (he always wanted to be clean). He did not wash his hands to eat because the whole reason for washing hands is to prevent tumah. But food that is less than a beitzah is not considered to give tumah.

He ate outside of the Sukkah because food that is less than a beitzah is considered a temporary meal (עראי), and is not forced to be eaten in the Sukkah.

He did not say Birkat Hamazon because under a beitzah is not considered being satiated.

So, if two kotavot are not obligated to be eaten in the Sukkah (which we learned from Rabban Gamliel) and if R' Tzaddok says that a beitzah is the required amount to be forced to eat in the Sukkah, we are forced to conclude that two kotavot are less than a beitzah. Ok, that sounds good but ... didn't R' Yehuda say that *one* kotevet is *more* than a beitzah? How can this be?

R' Yirmiyah says that it's possible that 2 kotavot without pits are indeed less than a beitzah, because it is according to the weight and a large kotevet with a pit is larger than a beitzah. He says that if you take two kabim (קבים) of dates and you take out their pits, the pits will be a little bigger than one kab. That means the pit is larger and it is possible for one date and its pit to be bigger than two dates without pits. [To explain this, lets say a pit weighs 1.1 and a date without a pit weighs .9. That means a date *with* a pit is 2. But *two* dates *without* pits weigh 1.8.]

Rava says that Rabban Gamliel didn't eat in the Sukkah because fruits of any amount are not obligated to be eaten in the Sukkah. He says that it is still possible for two dates without pits to be bigger than a beitzah because we do not go by *weight* but rather by *volume*.

When Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi was at the house of R' Eliezer ben Shamua, they brought to him dates and grapes. He ate them as עראי אכילת outside of the Sukkah. He adds the

words אכילת עראי because it is talking about the amount eaten (less than a beitzah), and only ate outside of the Sukkah because less than a beitzah is not obligated to be eaten in the Sukkah (implying that more than a beitzah is obligated). So now it turns into a question on Rava, because he said that *any* amount of fruit is פטור from Sukkah.

One answer could be that *all* amounts of fruit are considered אכילת עראי. Another could be that they did indeed eat a lot of fruits and were not obligated to eat them in the Sukkah. But they had together with it some bread that was considered עראי אכילת, so they had to eat in the Sukkah.

Both these answers look the same. However, the second says that even if it is a large amount of fruit, we see that fruit and bread do not add up collectively, and that each one was אכילת עראי separately.

The Gemara now brings a proof for Rava. R' Eliezer says that a person is obligated to eat 14 meals in the Sukkah (2 each day). If someone ate a meal of תרגימא (dessert) in the Sukkah, it counts as one of the 14 meals. Why would we say תרגימא and not fruit? Because fruit are not obligated for Sukkah!

The Gemara disproves this by saying that the תרגימא could have been fruit. It is also possible to say that the in that specific place, fruits are not common, therefore they were not mentioned.

Tosafot say that it is not possible to learn from here that תרגימא fulfills Shalosh Seudot on Shabbat, since the passuk where it is learned from is in the topic of כן, and כן was in place of bread (which means you need bread for Shalosh Seudot). And even if תרגימא was fulfilling, fruit wouldn't be since it wasn't with Sukkah.

R' Zvid says that kotevet hagasah is *less* than a beitzah. A proof for this is as follows. Beit Shamai say that if someone leaves seor (שאר) in his house on Pesach, he is חייב on kazayit, but with chametz, he is only חייב on a kotevet. Beit Hillel say that both are kazayit.

Why does Beit Shamai say that the amount of chametz is more than the amount of seor? If they wrote only chametz, seor would be included. So why the separation? Because for sure seor is more prohibited because there is more yeast in it, and because when they are mentioned in the Torah, they are separated, then we know their amounts are different.

We know that kazayit is the smallest measure. If indeed R' Yehuda is right, that would put beitzah in the middle and kotevet as the largest. Why would Beit Shamai jump from smallest to largest, skipping the middle? But by R' Zvid, kotevet is middle and then beitzah is the largest, and it would fit perfectly. Also, it is not possible that kotevet and beitzah are equal, because beitzah is more common and would surely be the only one used if they were both equal.

R' Yehuda says that a normal kotevet (not gasah) is less than a beitzah, and kotevet hagasah is *more* than a beitzah. Beit Shamai were talking about a normal kotevet which is

between beitzah and kazayit according to R' Yehuda, and even if a normal kotevet and beitzah are equal, it doesn't make a difference, since Beit Shamai wrote one of them.

Now we've disproved one proof for R' Zvid. The Gemara now brings one final one. For it, we require a little chart:

Amount	After eaten
כזית	Still hungry
כותבת הגסה	Not hungry
ביצה	Satiated (full)

Also, keep in mind the passuk: "ואכלת ושבעת וברכת"

R' Meir says that Birkat Hamazon is said on kazayit. He says that the *אכילה* the passuk talks about is eating kazayit and the *שביעה* is drinking. Rabbi Yehuda (*not* Rav Yehuda) says that the passuk speaks about *אכילה* that is satiating (*משביע*), which is a beitzah. If a beitzah is satiating, how is it possible that kotevet hagasah is only *מיתבא דעתיה* (makes you not hungry), as we stated before (top of page 9)? Therefore, kotevet hagasah *must* be less than beitzah.

Tosafot say that R' Shimon ben Shetach ate kazayit (which does not satiate you) and the king and queen ate a whole meal (more than beitzah – they were satiated), and afterwards, R' Shimon freed them from their obligation of Birkat Hamazon by saying it for them (*הוציא אותם ידי חובתם*). If kazayit is only *חייב* by Rabanan (which it is), and beitzah is from the Torah, how can R' Shimon free them from obligation, if he is not on the same level of obligation as them?

A person who is generally *חייב* in a mitzvah but at the moment is not, may free others from their obligation (*יצא מוציא*) because *זה ערבים זה לזה*. Even though the obligation level is not the same, he may still free them from their obligation.

[*new Gemara, פ' פד*]

R' Elazar says that whoever eats chelev today in the time that there is no Beit HaMikdash, must write down the amount that he ate, because perhaps in the future a *בית דין* will come and change the size of a kazayit (since chelev is *חייב* on kazayit).

The Gemara interprets the words *ירבה בשעורין* (change the size of kazayit) as meaning that they will change it to a kazayit katan (small kazayit). Rashi says that if he eats less than a standard kazayit (*בינוני* or *כזית* or *איגרוי*), he must still write down how much he wrote, because if the Beit Din makes kazayit smaller, he will be obligated to bring a korban.

The Gemara rejects this idea because a person only bring a korban if he regrets eating the chelev. But if he eats an amount that is currently permitted, he is not going to regret it!

The Gemara then concludes that the Beit Din will change kazayit to kazayit gadol (large kazayit). A person who eats chelev must write the amount since perhaps he will be exempt from a korban.

How could we have thought at all to say that it would be made smaller? Perhaps the Gemara thought that since it makes it smaller, it would enlarge the amount of korbanot to bring, hence the word ירבה.

R' Yochanan says that the shiurs/amounts and punishments are all Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai (Halacha to Moshe from Sinai). But aren't punishments written in the Torah? Then perhaps R' Yochanan meant to say the amounts *required for* punishments are Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai. There is a Breita to back this up.

Others say that the amount required for punishments were made up by עתניאל בן קנז and his Beit Din. How is it possible that a Navi makes new Halachot? He did not make new Halachot, and they were indeed Halacha LeMoshe MiSinai but rather the nation forgot the Halachot, and he simply renewed and retaught the Halachot. According to this, it is not possible to change the amount of kazayit.

[new Gemara, פ' קד]

R' Papa says that if someone eats meat with salt on it, the salt adds collectively to the shiur of kotevet hagasah. Even though the salt is not food, since it is eaten with the meat, it adds together.

Reish Lakish says that gravy or sauce on vegetables adds up collectively also to the kotevet hagasah. The Gemara says this is obvious. Why is this obvious and not so with the salt? Because the gravy itself is considered an actual liquid (משקה), whereas the salt is *not* considered food and yet it still adds up. But didn't we say in the Mishnah earlier that liquids and food don't add up collectively? Indeed we did, but anything that comes to enhance the taste of a food is considered a food.

Reish Lakish says that whoever eats אכילה גסה on Yom Kippur is פטור. There is a dispute between Rashi and Rambam about what אכילה גסה is. Rashi says that it is eating food even after one is full and does not take pleasure from eating, since he is full (however, if he eats something tasty and enjoys it, it is not considered אכילה גסה according to Rashi). Rambam says that it is eating after one is totally full, and it is so much that he feels nauseous if he eats anymore. Even if there is a good taste, he will still not enjoy it, and is still considered אכילה גסה.

If one eats to the point where he is full during Seudah Mafseket, and later on the night of Yom Kippur eats more, he would be פטור. The proof for this is that in the Torah it says not to eat something that will cause him to break the עינוי. But if he eats so much to the point that he hurts himself by eating, he is not included in this.

R' Yirmiyah states in the name of Reish Lakish that a person who is not a Cohen and eats from the תרומה by accident as גסה אכילה pays only the principle value but not the extra fifth that would be paid if it was a normal accident, because in the Torah it says "כי יאכל...", excluding any eating that causes any damage, which only pays the principle amount.

R' Yirmiyah says that a non-Cohen who eats from the תרומה in an abnormal fashion (כוסס) pays only the principle and not the fifth because he is considered to be damaging the food, since he eats it in a way that it is not meant to be eaten.

Why don't we bring Yom Kippur as an example for כוסס? The שאגת אריה says because in Yom Kippur you are not allowed to eat anything that would make you not hungry. Of course he wouldn't taste the food, but internally he would not be hungry, therefore he would be חייב.

[new Gemara, פב 97]

Mishnah

A pregnant woman that smells food, and because of these she feels a desire to eat, and if she doesn't eat, her life will be in danger may eat on Yom Kippur until the point where she feels fine again. She must be fed by *two professional doctors* that agree that her life is in danger if she does not eat. If there are no doctors present, she may be fed if the woman says that she feels she is in danger.

The **Ran** quotes a lengthy discussion by the Ramban if one may violate Shabbat for the unborn child, or only if the child is already born.

The Bahag says that if a woman knows that the unborn child will die if she does not eat, she may be fed, even if we do not know for sure whether or not the child will die.

The Ramban says that from this we see that one may violate Shabbat even for the unborn child and not for the mother. He brings a proof for what the Bahag says. We learn in the Gemara that Shmuel says that if a pregnant woman that dies during labor on Shabbat, but the child is still alive, it is permitted to bring a knife in order to cut open the mother and save the child. Rava says that it is even permitted to bring the knife from a public place into a private place (which is a direct sin of Shabbat). This shows that we would be able to violate Shabbat just to save the child, because the unborn child is considered a living person.

The Ramban continues and asks two questions. He says that if there is a danger to the mother during labor, it is permitted to kill the child for the sake of saving the mother's life. If the child's head already began to emerge, it is not permitted to kill the child, because the child is thought to be alive. But if it is permitted to violate Shabbat for the child, why would it be allowed to kill the child for the mother if it is thought to be a living person?

Also, in נידה מסכת נידה it says that someone who kills a baby that is one or two days old must receive the punishment of death. It says specifically a child one or two days old, and *not* an unborn child. Why is this, if an unborn child is considered a living person?

Tosafot say that in *מסכת סנהדרין* it says that all the mitzvot are *יעבר ואל יהרג* (notice the reversal of words) except if it is in public (in front of 10 men). If it is in public, it is *יעבור ואל יהרג*. If that's the case, then how could Esther have done what she did (have relations with a goy to public knowledge which would be considered giluyi arayot)? Didn't we just say that she cannot if it is in public or publicly known? Wait a second, why is the Gemara suddenly getting stuck with the public knowledge issue? Isn't the giluyi arayot she did not permitted altogether? Why wasn't the question about that?

Because we know that in the giluyi arayot issue, it was fine for her to do what she did since she was *קרקע עולם*. Okay, this is fine, so then why do they have to ask about the public thing? If she is *קרקע עולם*, isn't it okay if she did it? The answer is no, even though it may seem okay, there's still an element of chilul Hashem here. So why did it end up being that she was allowed to do it? Because the reasoning of *קרקע עולם* is so strong that it overrides the chilul Hashem.

Also, if a goy tells you to cut grass and feed it to his animals on Shabbat, you can do so even in public, because he is asking you to do it for his own personal benefit. But if he asks you to cut the grass and throw it into the water, he must die instead because it is violating the religion. What Achasverosh did was for his own personal pleasure, so therefore Esther could have done what she did.

Tosafot bring two proofs for *קרקע עולם*. If a goy tells a man that he will push the man on to a baby so the baby will die, and if he will not agree the goy will kill him, the man may let himself be pushed on to the baby, because he is not killing the baby really.

Tosafot say that this also applies to giluyi arayot and the woman is not really doing anything.

Also, the pasuk says "יקום איש על רעהו ורצחו נפש" which is an active doing, so we see that there needs to be an active doing in order to be chayav.

Okay, so now, where do we know that shefichut damim is *יעבור ואל יהרג*? Well, it's a logical thing to think that it is *יעבור ואל יהרג*. A person (we'll call him Reuven) came over to Rava and told him that the mayor of the city came to him and told him that if he doesn't kill another person (we'll call him Shimon), that the mayor will kill Reuven. Reuven asked Rava what must he do? Rava answers him that he must be killed and not to kill Shimon, because who says that Reuven's blood is better (actually, the Gemara says redder, not better) than Shimon's?

But then again, who says that Shimon's blood is better than Reuven's?

Rashi asks why Rava told Reuven he must be killed? Doesn't the passuk say "וחי בהם" and not "ומת בהם"? The answer is really that every Jew is important and loved by Hashem, and may violate a mitzvah in order to stay alive. But here, when there is another life at stake, it is a choice between only one person dying (Reuven) or one person dying (Shimon) *plus* the averah of shefichut damim. So Rashi says that it's better to have only one person die without the averah, rather than with it.

A pregnant woman smelled food on Yom Kippur and had a craving for it. People came over to Rebbe (R' Yehuda HaNasi) and asked him what they should do. Rebbe answered that they should whisper in her ear and remind her that it is Yom Kippur. So they went to her and whispered it, and she accepted it and decided not to eat. Later, Rebbe said that the

baby she was carrying was what the passuk “... ידעתוך בטרם אצרך בבטן ידעתוך...” was talking about (meaning that the baby was a very special baby). It turned out that the baby grew up to be R' Yochanan.

There is a similar story to this now. A pregnant woman smelled food on Yom Kippur. People came to R' Chanina and told him. He said to whisper to her that it is Yom Kippur. They whispered this but she did *not* accept it, and ate anyway. Later, R' Chanina said that the baby she was carrying was what the passuk “זורו רשעים מרחם” (wicked people are destined to become wicked already from the mother's womb) was talking about. It turns out that the baby grew up to be a person named Shabtai who used to buy out all the fruit from one place so that they had no more left, then sold it back at very high prices. Basically, he cheated them out of money.

[*new Gemara, top of פג*]

R' Yanai says that if a sick person says he must eat and a doctor says he does not have to, we listen to the sick person and feed him. This is because of the passuk “לב יודע מרת נפשו”, a person knows the bitterness and complications of his soul... basically, he knows himself better than anyone else does, even better than a doctor. The Gemara says this is obvious that we would listen to the sick person, because it is ספק נפשות, and we know that a ספק נפשות goes to the more lenient side. But we may have thought that since the doctor is a professional and knows what he's doing (we hope) that he would know better; but no, the Gemara says, the sick person knows best. R' Yanai also says that if *even one* doctor says the sick person must eat and the sick person says he doesn't have to, we listen to the doctor because perhaps the sick person is saying that he doesn't need to eat because his judgement is impaired from the sickness (תונבא).

The Gemara asks why the Mishnah did not mention that we also feed the sick person according to him or herself (because that's essentially what we're doing in the first case that R' Yanai brings)? Also, why did the Mishnah write that it takes two doctors to feed the sick person? We said in the second case that it takes only *one* doctor to feed him!

The answer to the first question is that the Mishnah was talking about a case where the sick person said he did not have to eat, in which case we would never feed him according to himself. But still, why did the Mishnah say there must be two doctors? Because the case the Mishnah spoke about was when the sick person said he doesn't have to eat and there was another doctor that agreed and said he doesn't have to it. So if this is so, we need *two* other doctors that say he must eat in order to feed him.

The Gemara says that it is obvious that in that case, where there is a ספק נפשות, because we know that when there is a doubt in nefashot, we are more lenient and for sure we would feed the sick person – what is the chiddush?

The Gemara answers that there are really two other doctors who say he does not have to eat, and yet we still follow the people who say to eat. This shows that even though there is a majority who say he does not have to eat (3 vs. 2), we are more lenient.

Even though R' Safra says that two are like a hundred, and a hundred are as if they are two, this is in relation to עדות. But in relation to appraisals and evaluations (אומדנא),

we do go after the majority. Then how is it possible that we follow the 2 instead of the 3 in the case we discussed? Because the ארמון we were talking about was in relation to that of money or property. However, we do not go according to the majority here because it is ספק נפשות. So in that case, if there was just one doctor saying he needs to eat (and the sick person doesn't say anything) and there are two that say he does not need to eat, there is no ספק נפשות, because 2 vs. 1 is not considered one, therefore we would *not eat*.

To sum up all the halachot we learned, let's make another little chart (when I write sick, it means the sick person):

<u>Says must eat:</u>	Sick	1 Doctor	2 Doctors	2 Doctors	1 Doctor
<u>Says doesn't have to:</u>	1 Doctor	Sick	Sick & 1 Doctor	Sick & 2 Doctors	2 Doctors
<u>Halacha:</u>	Eats	Eats	Eats	Eats	Doesn't Eat

[new Gemara, ג 97]

Mishnah

If someone who is sick with Bulmus (a disease that makes a person's face pale and he cannot see until he eats, and when he eats his face gets its color back), he may be fed until the color returns to his face and he can see again.

If a rabid dog bites someone, he may not be given to eat from the dog's liver (people thought that was a cure for rabies at the time) because we aren't sure if it is really a proven and working treatment for rabies. But R' Mattia Ben Charash says you *can* give him to eat from the dog's liver because he holds that it is a proven treatment.

R' Mattia ben Charash also says that if someone has a very strong aching in his throat, he may take medicine to heal it on Shabbat (normally that wouldn't be allowed), because it is a doubt if it is Pikuach Nefesh – even though it is not a danger now, there is a doubt and a possibility that it can develop into a danger.

If a rockslide fell on someone, and there is a doubt if he is actually under the rocks or not, or if he is alive or not, or if the person is a Jew or a goy, you have to move the rocks in order to check. If he is found alive, you must pull him out, but if he is found dead, we do not violate Shabbat for him.

Gemara

How did one know if a person's eyes brightened and could see again? If he knows how to differentiate between food that is healthy for him and food that is bad for him. Abayei says that he also has to be able to tell the difference between food that has a taste and food that has no taste.

If someone has Bulmus, we give him to eat the food with the smallest punishment. If there is a choice between non-kosher food and tevel (fruit that terumah and maaser were *not* taken from), we feed the person the non-kosher food, since its punishment is malkot, which is less than the punishment of tevel, מיתה בידי שמים.

If there is a choice between tevel and shevi'it (fruit that was grown during Shmitah and was not allowed to be eaten after a certain date), we give him shevi'it, because the punishment on shevi'it is just the punishment of any normal עשה mitzvah.

If there is a choice between tevel and terumah, that both have מיתה בידי שמים as their punishment, then there is an argument. Tana Kama (Rabanan) says that he must eat the tevel, and Ben Teima says he must eat the terumah.

Rabbah comes in and clarifies the argument a little bit. Suppose we have 25 grapes that are tevel and the person needs to eat 20 grapes. We have enough grapes to separate the terumah and maaser, and there will still be enough grapes left over for the person (about 23 will be left). In that case, there is *no* argument. The argument is if there are only 20 grapes that are tevel, where there aren't enough grapes in order to separate the terumah and maaser. So it's either he eats 20 grapes that are tevel *or* 18 grapes that are perfectly fine to eat, but 2 that are terumah. This is really what the argument is talking about.

Ben Teima says that terumah is less severe because it is allowed to Kohanim. But the Rabanan say that tevel is less severe because it is possible to fix it and make it allowed to *everyone*.

Rabbah says that you may separate the terumah and maaser from the tevel even on Shabbat (normally you wouldn't be able to because it is moving something from one place to another). Rabbah says that this is obvious, because fixing the tevel is only assur from Rabanan, and the tevel is from the Torah, so obviously it's better to fix it. Therefore, Rabbah says that the tevel grew in a flowerpot which has no holes at the bottom, so the tevel is only forbidden from Rabanan. So now *both* fixing and the tevel are assur from Rabanan. So now why do we have to go to all the trouble of separating the terumah and maaser? Why don't we just give the person the tevel to eat? I mean, it's only an averah on Rabanan, it's not too big a deal, why do we go to all the trouble of separating it? In order to prevent any eating of tevel, because even though now it's only Rabanan, what's to say that next time he will know if it is assur deRabanan or assur deOraita?

The **Ra'avad** was asked what would happen if a doctor tells a sick person that he must eat meat on Shabbat, but there wasn't any meat to eat. There was only a choice of to go and to shecht (לשחוט) an animal (which has a punishment of סקילה) or to eat non-kosher meat (which has a punishment of malkot). According to the logic that we used before, the sick person should eat non-kosher meat. But the Rishonim beg to differ...

The **Ran** says that if you eat non-kosher meat, it is equal to five [small] aveirot, and if you shecht on Shabbat, it's just one big aveirah. The Ran says that it is better to do one big aveirah than five smaller ones. The only exception he says is that if the sick person needs to eat less than a kazayit, it is better to feed him the non-kosher food.

The **Roash** says that it is better to shecht on Shabbat because we are afraid that if the sick person knows that the food is non-kosher, he may not want to eat it. The only exception

is in a case where the sick person cannot know if the food is kosher or not (semi-coma or simply not telling the person).

The Mishnah Berurah quotes the **Meharam from Rutenberg**. The Meharam says that for the sick person, Shabbat is just like any other day when he can shecht if he needs to, so therefore he may (actually, he's not doing the shechting, but others may do it for him).

Let's go back to what the Ran said. He says that a few big aveirot is better than a lot of smaller ones. Now let's refer to our example we gave with the grapes: there are two grapes of terumah, which is two big aveirot, *or* twenty grapes of tevel which are twenty small aveirot. According to the logic of the Ran, of course you must eat the terumah! If so, then how is it possible that Rabanan say that you eat the tevel instead?

Because we already know that the grapes grew in a flowerpot without a hole, so that means the terumah is only from Rabanan, and there aren't any big and small aveirot when it comes to things that are assur from Rabanan.

[new Gemara, : 79]

The Mishnah says "מפני שספק נפשות הוא וספק נפשות דוחה את השבת". Why does the Mishnah have to make this long statement? Couldn't it have just shortened it a little bit?

R' Yehuda said that Rav said that the reason the Mishnah had to specify that safek nefashot is more important than Shabbat, is because the case where the Mishnah is talking about (about being allowed to take medicine... see Mishnah, page 17) is when the sick person must start taking the medicine near the end of this Shabbat, and if he doesn't take it today, he will be in danger of dying next Shabbat. We might have thought that we would have waited till Shabbat is out, but we learn that we may even violate two Shabbats.

Also, it says in a Breita that it is permitted to heat up water on Shabbat in order to wash a sick person or to give him to drink, and it does not have to be for this Shabbat, but it can be in order to save him on a following Shabbat, and we do not say that we wait until Shabbat goes out because we think maybe he'll become better. We give him the water right away instead, even if it is a safek for the next Shabbat, not this one.

The Gemara says that we do not do any of these things (for example, warming up the water or feeding the sick person) by hands of a goy (נכרים) or young children, but rather by "Gedolei Yisrael". Neither do we tell a woman or a non-Jew (כותי) to do these things.

Tosafot say that even if there is a choice to take a goy or a Jew, we take the Jew, because it's possible that the goy will get lazy in the middle, and the sick person will be in danger. But in the case where we do not need immediate assistance, and it's not too big a deal if he gets lazy, we call a goy.

The Ran says that we take a Jew because if there is a child watching, we don't want him to think that we are violating Shabbat for the sick person with the difficulty of calling a goy, and we do not want him to call a goy when there really is immediate assistance needed, just because he learned from when he was a child.

The Ran continues and says that "Gedolei Yisrael" is what it sounds like- an adult (gadol) and not a young person, a Jew (Yisrael) and not a goy. The Rambam says that "Gedolei Yisrael" means literally, the wise people of Yisrael.

Now, if you look carefully at what I wrote, I said "we do not *do* any of these things by hands of a goy, etc." and then later I said "we do not tell a woman, etc." (which is actually the exact words of the Gemara). So why does the Gemara have the double language, do and tell?

Rashi says that it's because if a woman says by herself that we must violate Shabbat for the sick person, we do not listen to her. But, if a doctor and the woman say that we must, and they are against 2 doctors that say no, we listen to the woman and the doctor (the 2 vs. 2 case discussed on page 16) because the woman's opinion joins the doctor's.

Rashi continues and says that we don't listen to the woman because we think she is just overreacting from her emotions, since women are generally more emotional.

The Gemara says that someone who reacts quickly in a pikuach nefesh situation is praised, and one need not run to a Beit Din and ask if so-and-so is permitted. The Gemara brings three cases in which this statement applies:

- 1) If someone sees a child that fell into the water (and it is Shabbat), he may cast a net into the water and pull out the child, even though he catches fish along with the child, and every fish would be an averah from the Torah normally.
- 2) If a person saw a child fall into a deep pit, he may dig out stairs to go and get the child, even though it's an averah on Shabbat to do that.
- 3) If a child was locked behind a door, a person may break the door down and let the child out. But breaking the door would only be an averah from Rabanan, and we know that *for sure* pikuach nefesh would be greater than any mitzvah from Rabanan. So the Gemara says that in this case, it is really an averah from the Torah, because not only does he break down the door, but he needs to use the wood from the door, which turns it into an averah from the Torah (מתקן איסור).

Why do we need all these three cases, we could have just used the first by itself. We need the second case, because normally we would have thought that we just wait till Shabbat is over and in the meantime, we entertain the child while he's in the pit, but no, the case comes to tell us we can take him out right away. We need the third case to come and show us that even an averah from the Torah is permitted in the case of pikuach nefesh.

[new Gemara, פרק 97]

Note: This is not in the order that the Gemara writes it.

A group of Rabbis were taking a walk (if you need to know their names, it's in the Gemara) and were asked what the source from the Torah is for the fact pikuach nefesh is greater than Shabbat. R' Yishmael said from the passuk "אם במחלת ימצא הגנב". If, when there is a safek of pikuach nefesh, whether the burglar is out to kill the owner of the house or not, and we *may* kill him, which means we can override such a big mitzvah of shefichut damim, then קל וחומר we can violate Shabbat, which is more lenient than

shefichut damim. The Gemara disproves this by saying that the case is when we know for sure that the burglar is out to kill the owner, therefore there is no safek. Also, the owner may kill him only because of self defense (הבא להרגך השכם והרגו). The fact that the Gemara disproves this by saying there's no safek means that the question is not on the source of pikuach nefesh; rather it is what is the source for safek pikuach nefesh?

Rabbi Akiva says that it is from the passuk "כי יזיד איש... מעם מזבחי תקחנו למות" that we learn the source for safek pikuach nefesh. This passuk says that if a Cohen is in the middle of the avodah in Beit HaMikdash and he knows testimony that is needed in a court case, we do not stop him in the middle of the avodah in order to come to court. Rabbah bar Bar Chana says that the only time we would stop him is in order to save a life. So, we already know that the avodah is more important than Shabbat (since they did korbanot on Shabbat), and now we know that safek pikuach nefesh (here, it is the life-saving testimony of the Cohen) is more important than the avodah, kal vachomer that the safek pikuach nefesh is more important than Shabbat. The Gemara disproves this by bringing in Abayei, who says that the court sends 2 wise people to the Cohen and listen to what testimony he has, and decide if he should come to court or not. By doing this, we see that it is not a safek pikuach nefesh: the 2 people decide if it will save the life or not.

R' Eliezer says that since brit milah is more important than Shabbat, and the punishment for not doing it is karet later on in life, we see that pikuach nefesh later in life is more important than Shabbat. So, kal vachomer that if there is a safek pikuach nefesh *now*, then it is greater than Shabbat. The Gemara disproves this also by again saying that there is no proof that there is a safek.

R' Shimon ben Menasya says that it is from the passuk "ושמרו בני ישראל את השבת" because it says that Bnei Yisrael must keep the Shabbat; that means that one make violate one Shabbat in order to keep many more in the future. The Gemara then disproves this by saying that this is *only* in the case where there is a danger for sure.

Finally, R' Yehuda says in the name of Shmuel that the best answer to the question is the passuk "ורחי בהם". Specifically רחי and not ומת. Every other answer to the question has some little problem, but this answer is the perfect answer, and it is what the Gemara accepts.